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Abstract
We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game.
At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect
reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives
for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We ﬁnd that pure indirect reciprocity exists,
but also that the helping decisions are substantially a ected by strategic considerations. We ﬁnd
that the behavioral pattern can best be captured by non-selﬁsh preferences as assumed by reciprocity
models. Finally, we ﬁnd that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do
better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for
indirect reciprocity.
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11 Introduction
Among the recent approaches to conceive a more realistic model of human behavior by extending economic
theory by aspects that go beyond narrow self-interest, reciprocity has been prominent, both in theoretical
(e.g. Rabin, 1993, Levine, 1998, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006) and experimental work (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995, Fehr, Kirchsteiger,
and Riedl, 1993). The focus of the literature has so far been almost exclusively on direct reciprocity, where
a person who is a ected by the choice of another person can directly reward or punish the latter. Often,
though, it is not possible to reward or punish a person directly. In particular in large societies repaying
a favor directly can be di cult. Thus, the focus of our experimental study is indirect reciprocity, where
friendly or hostile acts of one person towards another are rewarded or punished by a third party. To enable
a third party to punish or reward, the information about the ﬁrst person’s decision has to be transmitted to
the third party. Thus, indirect reciprocity is closely linked to reputation and status. This is also the view
of Alexander (1987) who introduced the term indirect reciprocity. According to him, indirect reciprocity
creates an incentive for friendly behavior and, thus, provides the evolutionary basis for moral systems
prescribing cooperation.
For such a system of cooperation based on indirect reciprocity to work, two conditions have to be
satisﬁed. First, people have to be rewarded for good reputation (i.e. enough others have to act in an
indirectly reciprocal way) and second, they have to be willing to invest into reputation (i.e. they have to be
aware that others act in an indirectly reciprocal way). As evidence for the ﬁrst, Milinski, Semmann, and
Krambeck (2002) have shown that in an experiment donations to UNICEF are rewarded by other players.
Harbaugh (1998) argues (and provides supporting ﬁeld data) that donations to charity are in part driven
by a prestige motive,1 which supports the second of the above conditions. Apparently charities are aware
of the prestige motive (which might be driven by expectations of indirect reciprocity) since it is common
practice to announce donors’ names and contributions. The interplay of indirect reciprocity and strategic
1Andreoni and Petrie (2004) provide experimental evidence on the prestige motive. They show that subjects, when having
the options to contribute both to an anonymous and a broadcast public good, overwhelmingly choose the latter.
2reputation building can thus have substantial impact on economically relevant interaction.2
Seinen and Schram (2006) have conducted an experimental helping game to explore indirect reciprocity.
In this game, players are randomly matched and assigned to the role of a donor and a recipient. The donor
can help the recipient at a cost smaller than the recipient’s beneﬁt. A subject’s previous helping decisions
as donor are stored in a so-called image score and the recipient’s score is presented to the donor before he
decides whether to help or not. This game is nicely suited to study indirect reciprocity because it precludes
(in anonymous and su ciently large groups) any e ects of direct reciprocity as opposed to games such
as the prisoner’s dilemma. Seinen and Schram (2006) ﬁnd evidence of indirect reciprocity, because many
donors base their helping decision on the image score of the recipient.3 A substantial part of the donors,
however, also base their decision on their own image score, indicating that strategic reputation building is a
major force as well. The problem here is that any player whose choice can be indirectly reciprocal is at the
same time inﬂuencing his own reputation. Thus, when player A helps player B who has a good reputation,
we cannot be entirely sure whether this was done to reward B or to boost A’s own reputation.
To assess the interplay of indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building, it is necessary to sep-
arate out strategic incentives when observing indirectly reciprocal actions. An experimental design that
achieves this aim has to allow us to identify whether observed helping choices can be inﬂuenced by strate-
gic reputation building or not. When indirect reciprocity is not contaminated by incentives for strategic
reputation building by the donor, we call this pure indirect reciprocity.4 In Seinen and Schram the helping
decision can always be driven partly by the goal to achieve a high score to receive future rewards. To
2Beyond indirect reciprocity, reputation building can be crucial for the functioning of markets with repeated one-shot
interactions. This is increasingly relevant in markets that are becoming larger and more anonymous and hence less prone to
beinﬂuenced bydirect reciprocityas is exempliﬁed by e-commerce. Bolton et al. (2004) and Keser (2002) provideexperimental
evidenceon theimportance of reputationmechanisms in environments with repeated one-shot interactions. Indirect reciprocity
might be most e ective in mid-size groups such as small towns, where repeated direct interaction is infrequent and hence the
scope for direct reciprocity is limited but the group is small enough for reputation to spread around quickly.
3Wedekind and Milinski (2000) provide the ﬁrst experimental test of indirect reciprocity, based on only six periods. They
ﬁnd support for indirect reciprocity in the sense that recipients who are helped have had higher scores on average than
recipients who are not helped. Furthermore, donors who rarely help rather do so when the recipient has a high image score.
4Note that we understand indirect reciprocity in the sense of indirectly reciprocal actions, that is actions that reward
somebody who has been kind to a third party or punish somebody who has been unkind to a third party. One, but not the
3disentangle indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building, we use a helping game where in any
period only half of the players have a “public” score that is seen by donors, while the other players have a
“private” score. In particular, each subject has a public score either in the ﬁrst 40 periods of the experiment
or in the last 40 periods. This allows us to identify the e ects of strategic reputation building and whether
there is any pure indirect reciprocity. First, since donors with a private score interact with recipients with
a public score, we can study pure indirect reciprocity.5. Second, by comparing the behavior of donors
with public and private scores, we can evaluate the relative impact of strategic reputation building on the
helping rates.6
We test three main hypotheses. First, indirect reciprocity is present, i.e. the probability that donors help
increases in the recipient’s image score. In particular, pure indirect reciprocity is present, i.e. we will ﬁnd
this also when subjects do not have strategic incentives to build a reputation. Second, subjects strategically
build a reputation, i.e. for any given score of the recipient (including a private score) the average helping
rate of donors with a public image score is higher than that of donors with a private score. Third, strategic
only, possibly underlying motivation might be a desire to be indirectly reciprocal, that is a player might directly derive utility
from behaving in an indirectly reciprocal way. As we argue below, models of reciprocal motivation capture behavior in our
experiment better than competing models. What is actually the route why players behave in an indirectly reciprocal way is,
however, not our main concern. The crucial issue is that we control for strategic incentives. Thus pure indirect reciprocity
means here that donors condition on recipients’ reputation when they cannot inﬂuence their own reputation.
5Helping in our design might, however, also be driven by an internalized scoring rule since subjects with a private score
knew that there are subjects with a public score and hence knew that in principle somebody (for example the experimenter)
could compute also their score. As a result, the pure indirect reciprocity we ﬁnd could just be a result of internalizing this
hypothetical score. This problem, however, will exist in any experiment, and more importantly, for any real life situation
that gives an opportunity for indirect reciprocity (Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006, argue that this is a general problem in the
interpretation of economic experiments designed to be anonymous). Whenever I observe somebody’s previous actions before
deciding how to treat him, I am confronted with the theoretical possibility that somebody could observe my action and I could
hence internalize my reputation. This e ect might be somewhat strengthened in our experiment because of the swap of roles
of players with public and private score, but it cannot be completely excluded anyway. Moreover, this explanation provides
only an alternative to players being indirectly reciprocally motivated. It does not question that they act purely indirectely
reciprocally.
6In the small town example, our players with a private score correspond to short-term visitors who spent just enough time
in the town to pick up the local gossip about their respective interaction partners, but not long enough in order to have word
about their own actions spread around.
4reputation building weakens the reciprocal relation, i.e. the dependence of the donor’s helping rate on the
recipient’s score is weaker for donors with a public score than for donors with a private score. We ﬁnd
support for all three hypotheses. There is a clear positive relation between helping rates and recipients’
scores for both donors with public and private scores. The latter provides evidence for pure indirect
reciprocity, and this is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst from a laboratory experiment. The average
helping rate of donors with a public score is, however, more than twice the average helping rate of donors
with a private score. Hence, strategic reputation building plays an important role as well. Furthermore,
strategic reputation building undermines indirect reciprocity. The probability to help increases signiﬁcantly
less in the recipient’s score for donors with a public score than for those with a private score.
Our experiment also allows us to test some qualitative hypotheses derived from various models of social
preferences and thus to provide some assessment which of these models better captures crucial features
of the experimental data. While inequality aversion as modeled in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) as well as e ciency seeking and maximin preferences as modeled by Charness and
Rabin (2002) cannot account for important aspects of the empirical evidence, the reciprocity model by
Levine (1998) is consistent with pure indirect reciprocity as well as the reputation e ect. To a lesser degree
this is also true for the models by Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), where indirect
reciprocity results as a form of stochastic direct reciprocity. The reciprocity models capture the data better
than the models based on distributional concerns because they consider the helping act per se as kind
and thus higher scores deserve more help. The distributional models often capture reciprocity in other
settings because the total payo  serves as a proxy for kindness (i.e. a low payo s signals kindness). In this
experiment, it is not a good proxy because those with a high score are not those materially worst o .
Finally, our experiment also provides a test for models of the evolution of human cooperation. Look-
ing for explanations for the existence of indirect reciprocity, Nowak and Sigmund (1998) have conducted
simulations of an evolutionary process based on a repeated helping game. They ﬁnd that maximally dis-
criminating players will eventually take over the population. Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), however,
show that this result is based on a too restricted initial set of available strategies. Subjects who are not
indirectly reciprocal but only help in order to keep their own score at a level that induces a high prob-
ability of being helped (and hence base their decision only on their own score), could invade and take
5over a population of image scorers (i.e. players who base their choice only on the recipient’s score).7 In
our experiment about 15% of the population are pure strategists who are not reciprocal. Furthermore,
these subjects obtain a higher material payo , which is consistent with the invasion argument by Leimar
and Hammerstein (2001) and casts some doubts on the evolutionary explanation for indirect reciprocity
suggested by Nowak and Sigmund (1998).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the helping game and the experimental design. In
Section 3, we derive theoretical predictions for the indirect reciprocity game. The results are presented in
Section 4. Section 5 summarizes our results and provides concluding remarks.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1 The Helping Game
We conducted a computerized repeated helping game similar to the game studied by Nowak and Sigmund
(1998) and Seinen and Schram (2006). There were 16 subjects in each of our ﬁve experimental sessions.
The helping game was repeated for 80 periods. In each period the subjects were randomly matched
(independently between periods) in pairs and the role of donor and recipient were randomly assigned. The
donor had the choice whether or not to help the recipient at a cost c of 6 “Points”, which yielded a beneﬁt
b of 15 Points for the recipient. The recipient had no choice to make.
Each subject had a public score either in the ﬁrst 40 periods or in the last 40 periods. All subjects
were informed about this before the start of the experiment. The common knowledge of this change of
roles ensured that subjects were in a symmetric position (at least over the whole course of the experiment).
Hence, it precluded that donors with public and private scores behaved di erently because they considered
themselves advantaged or disadvantaged. Thus, we can clearly attribute behavioral di erences between
donors with public and private scores to strategic incentives. A score consisted of the number of times the
subject had helped and had not helped in the last 5 times as a donor. In case the subject had so far been
7More generally, Hagen and Hammerstein (2006) argue that models of cultural evolution of cooperation often rely on
conformism and can hence be vulnerable to strategic non-conformism.
6in the role of the donor less than 5 times, the score consisted of the total number of help and not help
decisions so far. When the recipient had a public score, the donor was informed about this score before
making the decision to help. A subject with a public score was also informed about her or his own score.
In case the subject had a private score, no score information was displayed (but subjects could easily keep
track of their own score and the experimental software also recorded the private scores).
A public score that is based on more than the last period allows in principle for punishments, because a
player who generally helps can occasionally punish a free-rider without being punished himself if the indi-
rectly reciprocal players do not demand a perfectly clean record. However, with our information structure,
it is impossible for the subjects to distinguish punishment from occasional defection. This would require
higher-order information, i.e. information about the score of the recipients whom the current recipient did
and did not help in previous periods.
The distinction into players with public and private scores is the main di erence to the design of Seinen
and Schram (2006), which closely implements the model of Nowak and Sigmund (1998). In their design
all players had a public score, except in a control treatment without any reputation. Other di erences
are rather minor and consequences of the main di erence. First, because of the restart with empty scores
after half of the periods, there is a shorter horizon. To compensate, we reduced the scores to the last ﬁve,
rather than six decisions. Second, we chose e ciency gains on an intermediate level of those in Seinen
and Schram (2006). Their treatment with high e ciency gain yields a very high helping rate, which might
make it di cult to detect any variation. On the other hand, we expected that the distinction into players
with private and public scores would lower the helping rate, so we raised the e ciency gains beyond their
low level in order to make an intermediate helping rate likely, which facilitates the detection of di erences
between players. In contrast to them, we also did not neutrally label the available actions (see below).
2.2 Experimental Procedures
The experimental software was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the experiments were run in
the computer laboratory at the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics of the University of Zurich
in Fall 2001. Participants were students from a variety of ﬁelds from the University of Zurich and the
7Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich and were recruited by phone. They were randomly assigned
to cubicles in the laboratory. Written instructions were provided and participants could read through them
at their own pace (see Appendix 2 for an English translation). Donor and recipient roles were labeled A
and B in the instructions, but the helping choices were labeled as such, because we considered the game
structure so obvious, that the use of the word “help” would not invoke any interpretations that subjects
would otherwise not come up with. At the end of the instructions there were ﬁve control questions to check
that participants had understood the key features of the experiment. The experiment started when all
participants had answered all the control questions correctly and after an oral summary of the instructions
had been given.
From the second period on, subjects were informed about the outcome of the last period. At the same
time they were either asked to make a decision or were informed that they were a recipient. The upper
part of the screen reviewed their role in the preceding period, the donor’s decision and the resulting payo 
and total payo  so far, as well as their own score if they had a public score in that half of the experiment.
A donor was asked for his choice in the lower part of the screen and there he was either informed about
the public score of the recipient or that the recipient had a private score. A recipient was only informed
about his role and that he did not have to make a choice. Following period 40, the roles of subjects with
public and private score were switched and the scores were cleared.
At the end of the experiment Points were converted into Swiss Francs at a rate of 1 Point = 0.1 Swiss
Franc. Subjects started the experiment with an endowment of 100 Points. No additional show-up fee was
paid. The sessions took between 64 and 81 minutes and earnings ranged from 6.40 to 55.60 Swiss Francs
with an average of 29.36 Swiss Francs (including the 10 Francs initial endowment).8
3 Predictions
In this section we consider predictions of various applicable models of behavior for our experimental setting.
We ﬁrst analyze the case in which all players are rational and selﬁsh and this is common knowledge.
8At the time of the experiment, one Swiss Franc was about $ 0.61 or 0.68 Euros.
8Experiments frequently ﬁnd deviations from the rational selﬁsh prediction. Our next steps address possible
reasons for such deviations. The ﬁrst deals with the possibility that players perceive the game as if it has an
inﬁnite horizon, which can enable indirect reciprocity and reputation building even among selﬁsh players.
Finally, we investigate the predictions of models of non-selﬁsh preferences.
3.1 Standard Prediction
If players are selﬁsh and rational, they will not help in the last period, irrespective of the score of the
recipient. If selﬁshness and rationality is common knowledge, backward induction generalizes this argument
to all periods. It implies that no player will ever help.
3.2 The Inﬁnitely Repeated Game
In this subsection, we present the theoretical prediction for the inﬁnitely repeated game. We do so because
experimental evidence overwhelmingly suggests that players are not able to perform backward induction
over more than a few periods and thus they might perceive the ﬁnitely (but many times) repeated game as
an inﬁnitely repeated game, at least until close to the end. We relegate a formal derivation of the inﬁnitely
repeated game to the appendix, because it is not the main focus of this paper. Here, we present the main
results in an intuitive way.
In Appendix 1, we show ﬁrst that there are equilibria in which players help. These equilibria exist
even if players never meet a direct or indirect interaction partner again. In the prototypical equilibrium,
the probability of getting help linerarly increases in one’s own score and the slope of the linear function is
determined by the parameters of the game - and the slope exactly makes players indi erent between helping
and not helping. There is an equilibrium in which helping is independent of the donor’s own score and
depends only on the score of the recipient. Unfortunately, this is not true for all equilibria. There are many
equilibria and there are some equilibria in which players keep their score within some interval of scores. In
such an equilibrium players always help if they otherwise would get a score below this interval and they
would never help if otherwise their score increases above the interval. Nevertheless, we can present some
properties of any symmetric stationary equilibrium. In particular, we show that if neighboring scores occur
9with positive probability, players are indi erent between having one or the other score, i.e. the expected
values of the scores are equal. If this were not the case, a (payo -maximizing) player would base his help
decision never on the recipient’s score, but on obtaining the score that yields the higher expected payo .
In short, a selﬁsh player conditions the helping choice on the recipient’s score only if the e ect on his own
score does not change his expected payo .
3.3 Social Preferences
In this and the next subsection, we discuss implications of various models of social preferences. We ﬁrst
analyze the incentives for the players with private score, in order to be able to disregard reputation e ects.
In the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (FS), players dislike inequality, i.e. they dislike if other players
have a higher or a lower payo  than the player herself. Applied to our experiment, a donor will only help if
he has a higher payo  than the recipient, if he believes to have at least the third highest payo , and if the
donor’s   (this parameter measures how much a player dislikes advantageous inequality) is unrealistically
large.9 If we assume that players perceive the game bilaterally and ignore the other players when they
decide whether to help or not, the condition for helping is     c
b+c = 2
7, which is possible and Fehr
and Schmidt derive a parameter distribution based on ultimatum game results in which about 40% of the
subjects satisfy this condition. Since donors with FS preferences only help if they expect the recipient to
have a lower payo  (at the end), they would condition their help on the score of the other players if the
score is a signal for the payo . This means that donors with a private score should reward recipients with
scores that yield a low payo . Furthermore, players with higher payo s are more likely to help.10
In the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) (BO), players dislike inequality in comparison to the group
average. Therefore, donors could help if they believe to earn more than the average of all other players.
9With   and   the FS parameters of the donor’s aversion to negative and positive inequality, let r be the number of players
who are richer than the donor. For simplicity assume further that the donor’s decision does not change the rankings of the
players. Then the donor helps if    
c(N 1+r )
c(N 1 r)+b. Because   < 1, this condistion can only be satisﬁed if r < 3. Furthermore,
the lowest possible value of   equals
6
7.
10Subjects are predicted to help more often recipients with higher scores only if they are naive, i.e. if they evaluate equity
only based on the cost of helping and ignore the beneﬁt of receiving help in the future.
10However, there is no reason for BO players to favor particular other players, e.g., based on the score. The
recipient’s score could be interpreted as a signal for the overall helping rate and hence the average payo ,
which would imply a higher predicted helping rate after observing a low score, the opposite of an indirectly
reciprocal helping behavior.
Charness and Rabin (2002) suggest a model in which players care about e ciency and about the payo 
of the poorest player. If players’ concern for e ciency is su ciently high, they should always help. The
concern for the income of the poorest yields similar predictions as the FS model.
In the reciprocity models of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenbergand Kirchsteiger (2004) (DK),players recipro-
cate kind behavior, and kindness is measured by comparing the actual choice with the available alternatives.
The most favorable choice for the other player has a kindness of 1, the least favorable a kindness of -1.
In these models players only reward directly kind actions, i.e., kind actions to themselves. In the helping
game, this is not excluded but it is rather unlikely that a high score of my recipient is the result of this
recipient helping me. Nevertheless, the most unkind score is a score of 0, resulting in an kindness of -1,
and the highest score results in a kindness of 1. Thus, scores below 50% are considered as unkind and
scores above 50% as increasingly kind. Thus, we expect help only for scores above 50%, and we expect
the helping probability to increase with the score. Since kindness is a relative concept in this model, i.e.,
since kindness is compared with the extremes of kindness, kindness is high for high scores even though it
most likely results from help towards other people and actually had little impact on the donor who gets
the possibility to reciprocate.
In the model of Levine (1998),11 players di er in a parameter  i that expresses how they value the
other players’ payo . This parameter can vary from very altruistic, in which case they value the other
players’ payo  positively, to very spiteful, in which case they value the other players’ payo  negatively.
Furthermore, the actual evaluation of another player’s payo  depends not only on one’s own parameter  i
but also on the player’s estimate of the other player’s parameter  j. This means that players are nicer
to people who are nicer as measured by this parameter. Since all donors are confronted with the same
11Charness and Rabin (2002) have a model with a similar mechanism. Players reciprocate with “concern withdrawal” when
they observe that the other player behaves selﬁshly or unkindly.
11distribution of scores of recipients the donors with higher  i are more likely to help, because they weight
the recipient’s payo  more positively. Because they help more, they get a higher score. This in turn implies
that players with higher scores have higher  i and deserve more help and hence donors with private score
are more likely to help recipients with a higher score.
Consequently, the Levine model incorporates indirect reciprocity, since the score signals the   of the
recipient, whereas in Rabin and DK, indirect reciprocity results because the score is a (relatively weak)
signal of the kindness of the recipient towards the donor. In an inﬁnitely large population, the score is not
informative about the kindness towards the donor. Thus, in this case, indirect reciprocity is possible in the
Levine model but it is not in the models of Rabin and DK.
3.4 Social Preferences and Reputation
Assume ﬁrst that the players with public score all are selﬁsh, but there is some form of pure indirect
reciprocity, e.g. because there are players with private score who have social preferences. Following the
same logic as Proposition 1 in Appendix 1, there are equilibria in which players with public scores behave
indirectly reciprocally, i.e. they condition their helping on the recipient’s score. These equilibria are char-
acterized by the property that the players are indi erent between the potential scores, which implies that
the expected payo  from having any of the scores that occur with positive probability should be equal.
If a higher score yields a higher probability to receive help, helping is less costly with a public score than
with a private score. Thus, also non-selﬁsh players are more likely to help when they have a public score.
(Since selﬁsh players do not help with a private score, it is obvious that they help more when they have
a public score.) If there are non-selﬁsh players, it is not necessary that all payo s yield the same return.
Suboptimally low scores are accepted by subjects who are willing to punish players for a low score, even
when it is costly to them and suboptimally high scores are accepted by subjects who are willing to reward
players for a high score, even when it is costly to them. Thus, it is likely that in an equilibrium with social
preferences not all scores yield the same return. This implies that there is most likely an optimal score,
and selﬁsh players will try to keep their score on this level.
123.5 Hypotheses
In the introduction, we formulated three hypotheses, which can be derived from the analysis in this section.
First, if there are subjects motivated by reciprocity, we will observe indirect reciprocity, i.e. the probability
that donors help increases in the recipient’s public score and in particular pure indirect reciprocity, i.e. this
holds for donors with private score. Second, all models assume that subjects also care about their own
payo . Thus, we predict strategic reputation building, i.e., the average helping rate of donors with public
score is higher than that of donors with private score. Third, strategic reputation building weakens the
reciprocal relation, because when the score is public, concerns for the payo  will in some cases dominate
reciprocal concerns.
4 Experimental Results
The overall experimental results are displayed in Figure 1, which shows the average helping behavior of
donors with public and private scores for di erent public scores of the recipients.12 Average helping rates
for the individual sessions by score status of donors and recipients are presented in Table 1 (for all scores of
the recipients aggregated). Table 1 shows in particular that helping rates are quite high (32%) even when
both donor and recipient have a private score, i.e. in a situation where indirect reciprocity and strategic
reputation building cannot play arole. This suggests that non-selﬁsh motives such as unconditional altruism
or e ciency concerns play a role as well. We can infer from Figure 1 and Table 1:
Result 1: The helping rate of donors, both with a public and a private score, increases with the
recipient’s score. The helping behavior of donors with a private score implies in particular that also pure
indirect reciprocity, i.e., non-strategic cooperative behavior is important.
Figure 1 provides immediate support for the ﬁrst hypothesis that donors behave indirectly reciprocally
and in particular for the existence of pure indirect reciprocity. The helping rate of donors with both public
and private score clearly increases with the score of the recipient, although the relation is monotone only for
12We restrict the presentation of the result to recipients with full scores, i.e. to scores based on ﬁve decisions. All our results























Donor with Public Score
Donor with Private Score
Figure 1: Donors’ average help rate for recipients with full public score
donors with private score. Astraightforward statistical test conﬁrms thesigniﬁcance of this positive relation.
The H0 hypothesis is that donors do not condition their decision on the recipient’s score. We conduct a
simple binomial test for this hypothesis based on the ﬁve sessions as independent observations. To obtain
an estimate whether there is a positive relation between the recipient’s score and the helping probability
we calculate the Spearman rank correlation between the recipient’s score and the dummy variable for the
donor’s helping decision. Under H0 in each individual session the probability that the estimated rank
correlation is positive equals 1
2 (actually slightly smaller, because of a small positive probability for a zero
correlation). We ﬁnd a positive correlation in all ﬁve sessions and can thus reject the H0 that there is no
positive relation at the 5% level.13 This holds independently of whether we consider donors with public or
private score.14 That it does for donors with private score is evidence for pure indirect reciprocity.
One possible reason for pure indirectly reciprocal behavior is non-selﬁsh preferences. If subjects care for
other subjects, then there can be a motive to provide help even when there is no material beneﬁt. How can




 5 = 1
32 < 5%. The same logic will apply to all our non-parametric tests below. Since all our hypotheses are
directed, we can apply one-sided tests throughout.
14Although for this test, we need only the sign of the correlations, we note that in all sessions the correlation was indeed
signiﬁcantly positive. Note, though, that the test of signiﬁcance of the correlations is not a valid test because the observations
are not independent.
14Session 1 2 3 4 5 Total
R public D public score 72% 78% 70% 66% 86% 74%
score D private score 45% 42% 22% 27% 49% 37%
R private D public score 72% 66% 63% 66% 75% 69%
score D private score 46% 32% 13% 21% 47% 32%
Table 1: Average help rates by score status of donors (D) and recipients (R), recipients with full score only
the di erent models of non-selﬁsh preferences account for the observed pattern? A concern for e ciency or
inequality aversion in the sense of BO cannot explain that helping increases with the recipient’s score. Both
motives predict helping independent of the recipient’s score.15 If the players base the inequality assessment
on the expected payo , the FS model predicts that recipients with scores yielding higher payo s will receive
less help. Table 2 shows for all sessions the net proﬁt that results from holding speciﬁc public scores, given
the helping rates for these public scores. It shows that in all sessions the score of 4 was the most proﬁtable
and the average payo  increases monotonously for scores below 4, while Figure 1 shows that the helping
rate increases weakly monotonously in the recipient’s score. Thus, the prediction that recipients with scores
yielding higher payo s receive less help can be rejected. When comparing payo s, advantageous inequality
can also result from a high payo  of the donor. Therefore, if helping is based on inequality aversion, donors
with higher payo s should be more likely to help. It turns out that this prediction cannot be conﬁrmed
either. Regressions reveal even a negative relation between accumulated payo  and probability to help,
also when controlling for time e ects and individual ﬁxed e ects.
A better explanation for pure indirect reciprocity is provided by the reciprocity models. All these
models predict a monotonous relation between score of the recipient and probability to get help. The
models of Rabin (1993) and DK even go further and predict that there should only be helping for scores
above 50%, i.e. for 3, 4, and 5. Interestingly, this is roughly the case. As Figure 1 reveals, for donors with
private score there is no help for scores of 0 and 1 and less than 10% for a score of 2. So these models
correctly capture the essential patterns of pure indirect reciprocity. As we argued above, however, Rabin
15As noted above, the recipient’s score could be interpreted as a signal for the overall helping rate and hence the average
payo . The BO model then predicts a higher helping rate after observing a low score, the opposite of what we observe.
15Session
Score
1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 -0.6 2.9 0.57 -0.6 -0.6 0.57
2 0.55 0.91 1.11 1.03 2.3 1.03
3 2.1 1.2 1.22 0.87 1.8 1.39
4 2.52 3.01 1.51 2.63 2.85 2.42
5 2.07 2.48 1.11 0.81 2.62 1.92
Table 2: Average expected return per period (in Points) from keeping a certain public score, based on
average help rates over the whole phase with full scores
and DK capture indirect reciprocity only in a sense of stochastic direct reciprocity, based on the score as
a noisy signal of previous behavior of the recipient towards the donor. Given our relatively large groups of
subjects, this signal is indeed very weak. The model by Levine (1998) thus captures these results in a more
convincing way. Levine’s model is also consistent with a number of further observations. Since it allows
for unconditional altruism, it can capture the relatively high rate of helping of donors with private score
towards recipients with private score. More speciﬁc, if a recipient has a private score, the donor’s estimate
of the recipient’s altruism should correspond to the average altruism in the reference group (even though
they actually help less often). This is consistent with the helping rate towards recipients with private scores
being similar to the average helping rate towards recipients with public scores.
We do not claim that a reciprocal motivation is the sole ultimate source for pure indirect reciprocity.
There can also be strategic helping by donors with private score (in order to encourage the recipient to help
in the future). However, it is not likely that this is a major force. If such strategic helping were important,
it should decrease over time. As we will show later in the paper, this is, however, not the case.16
16One could also argue that the positive relation between the recipient’s score and the helping probability does not result
from indirect reciprocity, but rather from a learning process. Donors might want to ﬁnd out what is a successful score and
may use the observed scores as orientation. Trying to adapt one’s own score to the observed recipients’ scores would imply to
help when one observes a high score and not to help when one observes a low score (though this should strictly be so only in
early periods or if subjects are highly myopic, because otherwise the total information one has gathered so far should dominate
16Considering again Figure 1 and Table 1, we make the further crucial observation:
Result 2: Donors with a public score help substantially more often than donors with a private score.
Hence, strategic cooperative behavior is of crucial importance as well.
This provides clear support for the second hypothesis that donors strategically build a reputation. The
average helping rate of donors with public score is higher than of those with private score for any score of
the recipient (including a private score, as can be seen from Table 1).17 The same holds for each individual
session. There is only one tie, in session 1 for a score of 0. Under the H0 hypothesis that strategic reputation
building is not relevant, in each session the probability is less than 1
2 that the helping rate is (weakly) higher
for donors with public score than for donors with private score for any recipient’s score. Thus, the fact
that this holds in all ﬁve sessions allows us to reject the H0 at the 5% level.
Support for our ﬁrst two hypotheses can also be derived from a panel data analysis (with the sessions
as independent units of observations). We use a random-e ects probit model.18 The ﬁrst model is
Pr(Help)it =  (const +   ·RsScoreit +   · DP ublicit +   ·(DPublic   RsScore)it),
with Pr(Help) the probability that the donor helps,   the normal cumulative distribution function, RsScore
the recipient’s score, DPublic a dummy that takes the value 1if the donor has a public scoreand 0 otherwise,
and DPublic   RsScore the interaction e ect between the recipient’s score and the dummy for a donor
with public score.   and   are signiﬁcantly positive, providing further support for the ﬁrst and second
hypothesis,   is signiﬁcantly negative, supporting the third hypothesis (see (I) in Table 3).19
this period’s recipient’s score). This potential interpretation, however, appears to be valid only for donors with public score,
because donors with private score do not have an incentive to ﬁnd out what constitutes a successful score.
17The helping rate is strictly higher except for recipients with ascore of 0, where the helping rate of both donors with public
and private scores is 0. There are, however, only 13 interactions with a recipient with a full score of 0. Among these, 12 are
with the same subject and hence all in session 1. Furthermore, since the helping rate for donors with private score is already
0 for recipients with a score of 1, this tie appears to simply result from censoring.
18All reported results are qualitatively the same for a logit model.
19We note that even if we restrict the analysis to donors with public score, the recipient’s score still has a highly signiﬁcant
positive impact. Thus, although as predicted by the third hypothesis, the reciprocity of donors with a public score is reduced,
it is not eliminated.
17In a second regression, we also control for the donor’s score and an interaction term of the donor’s
score and the dummy for the donor’s score being public (see (II) in Table 3). This even strengthens the
above results (since the absolute values of all relevant parameter estimates increase). Furthermore, the
donor’s score has a signiﬁcant positive impact, which suggests individual di erences in the propensity to
help, because this implies that some donors have consistently a higher score and help more often. The
interaction e ect between the donor’s score and the dummy indicating whether he has a public score,
however, is signiﬁcantly negative. This suggest that having a public score increases the helping rate more
if the donor has a low score. This is consistent with strategic reputation building. This behavior is rational
because the payo  maximizing score is at a high, but not the maximal possible level.
As can be seen in Table 1, in each session for both recipients with public and private score the helping
rates of donors with public score is about twice the helping rate of donors with private score. Hence, the
impact of strategic reputation building is not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also of substantial magnitude.
On the other hand, both for donors with public and private score, the average helping rate is only slightly
(about 5 percentage points) lower if the recipient has a private rather than a public score. Hence, recipients
with private and public scores are on average treated nearly equally.
The importance of strategic reputation building is also very vividly illustrated by Figure 2 which shows
the distribution (absolute frequencies on top of bars) of donors’ full (public or private) scores. The mode
of private scores is at a score of 0, with almost a uniform distribution over the remaining scores. For
public scores, in contrast, the mode of the distribution is at a score of 4, with few cases of scores below 3
and hardly any below 2.20 Interestingly, in all sessions the score that maximizes expected payo s for the
observed helping rates is 4 (see Table 2). Table 4 shows the result of a probit regression that supports
the view that donors with public scores strategically maintain the optimal score of 4.21 If their score falls
20Of the 19 full scores of 0, 15 come from the same subject, the only pure egoist. In all ﬁve sessions the mode for private
scores is 0. For public scores the mode is 4 in three sessions. In one session the mode is 3 and in one session it is 5, with 4
being the second most frequent public score in both cases.
21We use individual ﬁxed e ects since we are interested in how individuals respond to changes in their score. If we do not
use ﬁxed e ects, then we get a bias, because players who always have a score of 5 trivially help more than those who have a
































log likelihood -636.19 -496.16
Table 3: Random-e ects probit model for the help choice. (II) includes controls for the donor’s score as
well as an interaction e ect with the dummy whether the donor’s score is public. (II) is the superior model
both according to the Bayesian Information Criterion and Akaike Information Criterio. Data is restricted
to the cases with full score for both players. *: p < 0.05, **:p < 0.01, ***:p < 0.001.
below 4, they increase their probability to help, if it is greater than 4, they decrease it. This is only true
for donors with a public score. The helping rate of donors with private scores does not depend on whether
their score is larger or smaller than 4.22
While these results show that donors are clearly inﬂuenced by strategic considerations, they also exhibit
pure indirect reciprocity, not driven by strategic concerns.23 As shown in Proposition 1 in Appendix 1,
22Since a private score cannot be observed, it cannot yield any direct beneﬁts (only possibly indirect spill-over e ects from
raising average cooperativeness in the session). Since maintaining a positive score is, however, costly, the optimal private score
is 0.
23To some degree, this has to be the case. Since all our subjects have a public score in one half of the experiment and




















Figure 2: Distribution of public and private (post-decision) donors’ scores for all interactions where the
donor had a full score (except for following donors’ decisions in the last period because in that case the
resulting score could not possibly be relevant for future interaction). Absolute numbers appear on the top
of the bars. The total number of the included scores is 2480, 1227 where the score is public and 1253
where the score is private (the di erence is a result of the random allocation of donor and recipient roles,
apparently it just happened that players with a private score were chosen slightly more often as donors).
purely selﬁsh subjects would only di erentiate their helping if they were indi erent between the scores
that occur with positive probability. Table 2 shows that 4 was the optimal score in all 5 sessions. If
the expected payo  was the same for the highest three scores, the probability that in all ﬁve session the




= 0.012. So, the hypothesis that there is no
systematic di erence in the returns to di erent scores can be rejected.
Players who are motivated by reciprocity concerns would be more willing to deviate from the optimal
score in order to reward or punish others. Hence their public scores should vary more across time than that
of a selﬁsh subject. On the other hand, they should help more often when they have a private score than
a private score in the other half of the experiment, the subjects with public and those with private score are the same
participants. The motivation behind their reciprocity when they have a private score should also be present when they have
a public score. The question is hence more precisely whether the strategic considerations completely dominate the reciprocal
concerns. Our results show that this is not the case.
20Donors with public scores Donors with private scores
RsScore 0.5614*** 1.0669***
(0.0893) (0.1427)
ownscore < 4 0.7004*** -0.0611
(0.1854) (0.4204)
ownscore > 4 -0.8339*** -0.0542
(0.2374) (0.4949)
Indiv. fixed effects yes yes
const -2.4768*** -4.3056***
(0.4542) (0.07080)
Table 4: Probit models for the help choice of donors with public and with private scores. RsScore is the
recipient’s score. “ownscore < 4” is a dummy that equals 1 when the donor’s own score is smaller than 4.
“ownscore > 4” is a dummy that equals 1 when the donor’s own score is greater than 4. Individual ﬁxed
e ect are used in both regressions. Robust standard errors take the dependence of the data within sessions
into account. Only data with full scores for donor and recipient is used.
the selﬁsh subjects. This yields the prediction that the helping rate when a subject has a private score is
correlated with the variance of the subject’s own score when the subject has a public score. This is indeed
the case. In all sessions there is a positive rank correlation between the two, which occurs at random with
a probability of 1
32.24 We further observe:
Result 3: There is substantial heterogeneity in behavior both in terms of indirect reciprocity and strategic
reputation building.
An advantage of our design is that we can study the importance of strategic reputation building on
an individual basis by comparing the helping rates with public and with private score within subjects.
Table 5 shows a classiﬁcation of subjects. We call a subject strategic if her helping rates are generally
higher in the part of the experiment where she has a public score than in the part where she has a private
score. A strategic subject is called strongly strategic if the helping rates with public score are in most cases
24Actually, in all but one seesion the correlation was highly signiﬁcant, but this is not a valid test since the observations
are not independent.
21Pure Strat Strong* Str. Weak Str. Non-Str. Total
Reciprocal 8 12 14 4 (5) 38 (39)
Non-Reciprocal 12 11 7 6 (11) 36 (41)
Simple Egoist 1 1
Simple Altruist 4 4
Negativ Rec. Altr. 1 1
Total 20 23 21 16 80
Table 5: Classiﬁcation of individual subjects (in absolute numbers). Numbers in parantheses include special
types of reciprocal (negatively reciprocal altruist) and non-reciprocal (simple egoist and simple altruist)
non-strategic types. These types are listed separately in the third to ﬁfth rows. Strong* Strategic (third
column) refers to the players who are strongly strategic but not purely strategic.
at least twice the helping rate with private score.25 Otherwise she is called weakly strategic. Finally, a
pure strategist never helps when she has a private score, but does so several times otherwise.26 There are
several special cases of non-strategic subjects. Simple egoists never help, simple altruists always help and
negatively reciprocal altruists always help if the recipient has a private score or if the recipient’s public
score is above some cut-o  level, but not for a lower public score. A subject is classiﬁed as reciprocal if
there is a clear positive relation between the recipient’s score and the helping rate.27
25For the classiﬁcation of both strategic and strongly strategic, we allowed deviations from the respective criterion for one
value of the recipient’s public score and in that case required it to hold strictly for at least two values of the recipient’s score.
We always required the respective criterion to hold for the interactions where the recipient had a private score because their
number was much higher than the interaction with recipients of any single public score, so a violation of the criterion could
not be driven by a small number of observations.
26Note that the pure strategists are a subset of the strongly strategic subjects, but in the table the third column shows
those stronly strategic subjects which are not purely strategic.
27We allowed one exception from the criterion in the sense that for one low score the helping rate was allowed to be higher
than for one or several higher scores or for one high score the helping rate was allowed to be lower than for one or several
lower scores. In these cases we required at least two either low scores where the helping rate was lower than that for all higher
scores or high scores where the helping rate was higher than for each lower score. A ﬂat helping rate in case the donor had a
private score was allowed if the helping rate in case he had a public score showed a clear positive relation. For most subjects,
the classiﬁcation was straightforward, because there was either a clear monotone relation or none at all.
22Strongly Strategic Weakly or Non-Strategic Total
Reciprocal 1.14 (20) 0.69 (19) 0.92 (39)
Non-Reciprocal 1.23 (23) 0.87 (18) 1.08 (41)
Total 1.19 (43) 0.78 (37)
Table 6: Payo s relative to average session payo  for strongly strategic versus weakly or non-strategic and
for reciprocal versus non-reciprocal players, number of players in the respective category in parantheses.
As Table 5 shows, the majority of subjects is clearly strategic. The crucial qualitative aspects of the
distribution of types (i.e. that only a minority is non-strategic and that the share of reciprocal and non-
reciprocal subjects is about equal) also hold for the two subsets of subjects that have a public score in
the ﬁrst or in the second half of the experiment, as well as in each session.28 Surprisingly, there is only
one negatively reciprocal altruist, which intuitively appears to be a perfectly reasonable and in particular
socially desirable type (helps in general but punishes egoists). Some of the 4 simple altruists might be
negatively reciprocal altruists, because they never encountered a recipient with a score below 2. Thus, we
ﬁnd a high share of subjects who are reciprocal but even a higher share that are strategic. Interestingly,
40% of the pure strategists and 52% of the other strong strategist are also clearly reciprocal. Hence,
while their primary motive to help appears to be strategic reputation building, they are also concerned
with providing incentives for the other subjects. Instead of just exploiting the cooperative system based
on indirect reciprocity, they also stabilize it.29 The remaining 60% of pure strategists (15% of the total
population), however, appear to be of the type predicted by Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) to invade the
population. We next observe:
Result 4: Strongly strategic subjects obtain signiﬁcantly higher payo s than subjects who are at most
weakly strategic. Reciprocal subjects obtain lower payo s than non-reciprocal subjects.
Conﬁrming straightforward intuition, strategic reputation building pays, whereas reciprocity does not.
Table 6 shows the average payo s (relative to the average payo s in the session) of subjects by being
28The number of reciprocal subjects varies between 6 and 10 among the sessions, and the number of non-strategic subjects
between 2 and 5.
29This can be seen as being strategic on a higher level, because due to the matching procedure, donors could proﬁt from
inducing others to help, either by later being matched with them again or by indirect e ects.
23reciprocal and strongly strategic, where we pool the pure and other strongly strategic players on the one
had and those that were classiﬁed as weakly or non-strategic on the other hand. Clearly, the former
outperform the latter, which does not come as a surprise because being strategic implies, conditioned on
the public score, a lower private score and hence lower costs for helping. The advantage of the strongly
strategic players is, however, remarkably large.30 More importantly, it pays not to be reciprocal, apparently
because being reciprocal distracts from perfectly ﬁne-tuning one’s own score (or, in case of private scores,
is a pure waste).31 This indicates that in an evolutionary game based on this repeated helping game and
with the experimentally observed player types, the strongly strategic non-reciprocal types would drive out
the other types and would eventually undermine the cooperation. Given that the relative payo  of the non-
reciprocal strongly strategic players is almost twice that of the reciprocal weakly or non-strategic players,
the evolutionary process would be quite fast for any su ciently payo -sensitive dynamic. Finally, we look
at the time dependence of our data and observe:
Results 5: End-game e ects are consistent with the major patterns of behavior.
Figure 3 shows the development of the average helping rates in the ﬁrst 40 and the second 40 periods.
While there is a clear drop in the last two periods in both cases, the helping rate is remarkably stable
until the third to last. Since the expected return to a high score decreases sharply towards the end of the
experiment, one might have expected helping rates to drop earlier. An analysis of the sources of the end-
game e ect is remarkably consistent with our above classiﬁcation of subjects into purely strategic, strongly
strategic, weakly strategic and non-strategic. A subject who helps primarily in order to strategically build
a score would be expected to lower his or her helping rate in the last periods when having a public score.
30If we study the data in a more disaggregated way, we ﬁnd that the payo  for the purely strategic is slightly higher than
that for the other strongly strategic and the payo  for the weakly strategic is substantially higher than for the non-strategic.
Since the numbers of observations is too low for some categories in some sessions to derive meaningful results and since the
largest di erence is between strongly (but not purely) strategic and weakly strategic we aggregated the data in two categories
for the present analysis.
31The average relative payo s are larger for the strongly strategic than for the at most weakly strategic in all 5 sessions (for
the non-reciprocal, for the reciprocal as well as for the whole sample) and hence we can reject the hypothesis that the strongly
strategic do not do better at p = 5%. The non-reciprocal do better than the reciprocal in only four sessions and hence this
test misses statistical signiﬁcance.

























Figure 3: Average helping rates over all sessions for the respective 40 periods of the ﬁrst and the second
half of the experiment
The comparison of individual subjects’ helping rates in the last two periods with their overall helping rates
when they have a public score is consistent with this expectation. Out of 17 subjects whom we classiﬁed
as purely strategic and who have been a donor at least once in the last two periods, only 2 increase their
helping rate, while 15 lower it.32 The corresponding numbers for the other strongly strategic players are 4
and 14, for the weakly strategic they are 5 and 8 and for the non-strategic they are 4 (plus 4 with a constant
helping rate) and 5. Thus, the end-game behavior clearly corresponds to our classiﬁcation of subjects in
terms of strategic behavior. Subjects classiﬁed as strongly strategic exhibit a clear drop in helping behavior
towards the end while those classiﬁed as weakly or non-strategic do not.33
Furthermore, the end-game e ect is almost exclusively restricted to the subjects with a public score,
32Most subjects were a donor only once in the last two periods. For these players, increasing the helping rate means helping
this one time and decreasing the helping rate means not helping this one time.
33Overall helping rates do not di er dramatically between the di erent categories in the phase when subjects have a public
score. For purely strategic subjects it is 67%, for the other strongly strategic 68%, for weakly strategic 84%, and for non-
strategic 72%. Therefore, the observation concerning end-game e ects is not an artifact of di erences in overall helping
rates.
25consistent with our interpretation that a substantial share of helping behavior by donors with a public
score is driven by strategic reputation building, while that of subjects with a private score is pure indirect
reciprocity (and not, for example, strategic in a sense of trying to provide incentives for others to help).
For players with a private score, the helping rate in the last two periods of the ﬁrst phase is nearly equal
to the average rate (period 39: 25%, period 40: 35%, overall average: 38%, the rate is below 25% already in
three earlier periods). In the second phase the helping rate is also only slightly below the average (period
39: 28%, period 40: 19%, overall average: 31%, the rate is below 19% already in six earlier periods). In
contrast, for players with a public score, the helpings rate drops dramatically below the average in the last
two periods of both the ﬁrst and the second phase (First phase: period 39: 33%, period 40: 29%, overall
average: 74%, the helping rate is above 50% in all previous periods; second phase: period 39: 41%, period
40: 29%, overall average: 72%, the helping rate is above 45% in all previous periods). In particular, the
helping rate of donors with a public score almost drops to the level of donors with a private score, which
we would expect if the di erence in their behavior is driven by strategic reputation building that cannot
matter in the last period.
5 Conclusions
We have conducted an experimental helping game where at any time only half of the subjects have a
public score and hence a strategic incentive to help. Thus, we can study both pure indirect reciprocity
and the impact of strategic incentives. The interaction of donors with public and private scores is the
fundamental di erence to the helping experiment by Seinen and Schram (2006). In their experiment, all
subjects could build up an image score (or none in the control treatment) and hence it is not possible to
clearly distinguish between helping choices that are purely indirectly reciprocal and helping choices that
are driven by attempts to improve one’s own score.
From a general perspective, our separation between subjects who can strategically build a reputation
and those who cannot, provides a clean separation between non-selﬁsh cooperative behavior (helping by
donors with private scores) and strategic cooperative behavior (the di erence in behavior of donors with
private and public scores). The average helping rate of donors with private score of more than 30% is as
26clear evidence for the existence of non-strategic cooperative behavior as the substantially higher average
helping rate of donors with a public score is evidence for strategic reputation building. From a more
speciﬁc perspective, we are the ﬁrst to ﬁnd clear evidence for indirect reciprocity even in the absence of
strategic incentives for reputation building, but we also ﬁnd very strong e ects of strategic reputation
building. Speciﬁcally, 80% of subjects react to strategic incentives, including more than 50% whose helping
rates more than double and 25% who only help when they have an incentive to do so. The pure indirect
reciprocity that we ﬁnd is inconsistent with outcome oriented models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or
Bolton an Ockenfels (2000). It is, in contrast, consistent with the reciprocity approaches by Rabin (1993),
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and in particular with the model by Levine (1998).
Our data also allows to shed some light on a recent discussion on the evolution of cooperation. Con-
cerning the empirical relevance of the invasion predicted by Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), we clearly
ﬁnd strategic non-reciprocal players who also receive higher payo s than other types. This casts some
doubts on the evolutionary explanation for cooperation based on indirect reciprocity suggested by Nowak
and Sigmund (1998) because the types predicted to undermine the cooperation by exploiting the system
are clearly present and more successful. Put di erently, the argument by Leimar and Hammerstein that
the set of potential types chosen in the simulations by Nowak and Sigmund is too restricted is not only
valid on theoretical grounds, but is also strongly supported by our experimental data. The exploiting types
actually exist, so any simulation or evolutionary model that tries to explain altruistic behavior has to take
them into account. Therefore, an evolutionary explanation for the presence of indirect reciprocity (that is
documented by several experiments, including ours) has to be richer in structure to explain why reciprocal
players might survive in the presence of non-reciprocal strategic players. Furthermore, the helping rate
of 37% by donors with a private score contradicts the evolutionary model by Nowak and Sigmund. In
their model indirect reciprocity evolves where players can build a reputation. The donors with a private
score, however, cannot build a reputation. Their helping behavior would be consistent with the Nowak
and Sigmund approach only if one assumes that they behave maladaptively in this environment. On the
other hand, the subjects behave very adaptively, because donors with a public score help twice as often and
hence seem to clearly understand the incentives of reputation building. Hence, there appear to be further
underlying motivations.
27As a ﬁnal contribution, our experiment shows that evolutionary models can be tested in the laboratory,
in our case by proving the existence of a type that would undermine the process that drives the result
of the evolutionary model. Evolutionary explanations for a behavior are often vulnerable to the existence
of strategic types that successfully mimic a property that is the basis for the evolutionary advantage of
the ﬁttest type. Exposing subjects in the laboratory to a situation as assumed by the evolutionary model
permits a test for the existence of these mimicking types.
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30Appendix 1
In this appendix, we analyze the inﬁnitely repeated game. To keep the analysis tractable, we make a number
of simplifying assumptions. We assume that the game has the following structure: Half of the players can
help in the even rounds and the other half of the players can help in the odd rounds. Furthermore, we
assume that players discount their future payo s after a period in which they are recipients. The discount
factor equals  . We also slightly modify the way in which the score is maintained. In the experiment, the
score consists of the last 5 periods. For the analysis of the inﬁnitely repeated game, we assume that the
score consist of H decisions of the past. Whenever the score is updated, the new decision does not replace
the oldest decision in the score but one randomly selected decision. To permit the player to condition his
decision on his own score, he gets to know which score has been deleted before he has to decide whether to
help or not. This way, it is for instance possible that the player exactly keeps his score constant.
We assume that the probability that a player is paired with a player with whom he directly or indirectly
interacted before equals zero. (This is a good approximation if there are many players.) Thus, players with
private scores have no incentive to help. If M out of N players do have a public score, then recipients with
public score meet a player with public score with a probability of M 1
N 1. Consequently, every equilibrium in
a game that also contains players with private scores corresponds to an equilibrium in which there are no
players with private score but the beneﬁt equals only bM 1
N 1. For this reason, we consider a game in which
there are only players with public score for the remainder of this section.
Let hk be the probability of getting help as a recipient with a score of k   {0,...H}, let pk be the
probability of having a score of k as a recipient and qk be the probability of having a score of k as a donor.
In the latter case, k ranges from 0 to H   1 because the decision as donor will be the Hth element in the
score (since one element of the score is deleted before a donor makes a decision).
The basic idea behind the characterization of the equilibria consist in the observation that players will
condition their choice on the recipient’s score only if the future beneﬁt from the higher score exactly o sets
the immediate cost of helping, i.e., the player has to be indi erent between helping and not helping. As will
be shown in the following proposition, this is the case if the di erence between the helping probabilities of
the adjacent scores equals   := c
Hb(1 + (1    )(H   1)).
31In the following proposition, we will show that there are inﬁnitely many equilibria if H  < 1 (see a)
and we will present some properties of all equilibria (independent of whether H  < 1 or not; see b).
Proposition 1 (a) If H  < 1 then for all     [0,1   H ], there is an equilibrium, in which hk =   + k .
In this equilibrium, the probability pk of having a score k is positive for all scores k if     (0,1   H ).
(b) Consider a stationary, symmetric, subgame perfect equilibrium. If pk > 0 for k   I = {k,k+1,..., ¯ k},
then there is a value   such that hk =   + k  for k   I.
Remarks: Note, that     c
bH for     1. This implies that for the parameters of the experiment for
su ciently high  ,     6·15
15·7·H < 1
H, which means that the di erence between the helping rates for the
highest (H) and lowest (0) scores is smaller than 1. Thus, in this case, Proposition 1(a) applies and there
are many equilibria in which all scores occur. Furthermore, there are equilibria in which there is no help.
Obviously, there is an equilibrium with hk = 0 for all k. Additionally, helping rates hk   k  yield an
equilibrium in which the probability of having a score of zero equals 1. With   = 1   H , there is also an
equilibrium in which the helping probability equals 1.
Interestingly there are many equilibria. In particular, there are also equilibria in which the donors
condition their helping on their own score. For an example of an equilibrium in which not all scores occur
with positive probability, we use the parameters from the experiment and take     1. In this case donors
are indi erent between adjacent scores if the helping rate di ers by 6
35. We present an equilibrium in which
players maintain a score between 2 and 3. In this equilibrium only donors with a score of 2 condition their
help on the score of the recipient. These donors help recipients with a score of 2 with probability 3
5, and
help recipients with a score of 3 with probability 31
35; in the other cases the recipients does not get help.
If the donor has a score of 1, the recipient gets help for sure and in all other cases, the recipient does not
get help. In steady state, there are 16% recipients with a score of 2 and 84% recipients with a score of 3.
Recipients with score 0, 1, and 5 get help with probability 0.064, recipients with score of 2 get help with
probability of 0.424 > 2  6
35 + 0.064 and recipients with a score of 3 get help with probability 0.424+ 6
35.
In this equilibrium donors are indi erent of having a score of 2 or 3, but strictly prefer these scores to all
other scores.
32It is also possible that the support of the probability distribution of pk is not connected. In that case,
players are indi erent between the scores within each connected component, but not necessarily between
scores of di erent connected components. However, the utility di erences between components cannot be
too large, because otherwise the players with scores in one connected component have an incentive to
“move” to the scores in the other component. The maximum possible utility di erence depends on the
positions of the connected components and on the discount factor. For     1, the maximum possible
di erence goes to zero. Part (b) of the proposition thus implies that the graph of hk lies on parallel lines
on the di erent connected components of the support of the probability distribution of pk. It lies on one
line when     1.
Proof. We start with the proof of (b). Let Vk, k   {0,1,...,H   1} be a donor’s expected proﬁt before
his helping decision if he has a score of k, i.e. after one of his decisions is cleared from the score. First,
we show that for a score k   {k,..., ¯ k   1}, the donor is indi erent between helping and not helping. If
this were not the case then, because of the symmetry, all donors would either help or not help when they
have score k. Consider the case in which the donors always help. (For the case in which all donors do not
help, a similar argument applies.) Because of the stationarity condition the distribution of scores has to
be constant over time. We apply this argument to the distribution of the scores of the donors. It implies
in particular, that the probability of a donor having a score of at least k cannot change. Thus, the donors
with score k   1 never help because the donors with score k and higher will also have a score of at least k
when they decide the next time. But if the donors with score k   1 never help and the donors with score
k always help, the score k will never occur for the recipients. This contradicts the assumption pk > 0.
If the recipient scores between k and ¯ k occur with positive probability, then the donor scores between
k   1 and ¯ k occur. For k between k   1 and ¯ k   1 we get




H   k   1
H
Vk+1) (1)
and for k between k and ¯ k,we get




H   k
H
Vk) (2)
33We can use the same Vk in both formulas, because for k between k and ¯ k   1, the donor is indi erent.
Using (1) for k   1 and combining it with (2), we get Vk = Vk 1 + c for k between k and ¯ k.
Let us deﬁne k0 = k   1 and d = k   k + 1. Then, we get from (2)




H   k
H
Vk0+d)
Vk0 + dc = bhk0+d +  (Vk0 +
Hd   k0   d
H
c)
Vk0(1   ) = bhk0+d   c(d    
(H   1)d   k0
H
)






(H    (H   1))
This is true for any d, in particular for d = 0. Hence, for all d:










hk = hk0+d = hk0 + d
c
Hb
(H    (H   1))
= hk0 + (k   k0)
c
Hb
(1 + (1    )(H   1))
= hk0    k0 + k 
This proves (b).
Let us now prove (a) for     [0,1   H ]. As shown above, players are indi erent in their helping
decisions if hk =   + k . We have described above the equilibria for   = 0 and   = 1  H . Let us now
consider     (0,1   H ). We will show that there are probabilities pk such that the helping probabilities
hk (unconditional on the donor’s score) generate a stationary process. In the stationary equilibrium,
players always face the same distribution of scores of the recipients. Therefore, we can deﬁne the a-priory
probability that a donor will help, i.e. the probability that the donor helps before he knows the score of the
recipient. We denote this probability by  . Then, the score follows a Markov process which is determined
by   and the score forgetting process. It can be shown that the eigenspace of the eigenvalue 1 for the
corresponding Markov matrix has dimension 1. Thus, there is a unique stationary distribution of scores
34for the recipients pk( ) for every  . Now, in equilibrium a recipient with score k gets help with probability
hk =  + k . With the distribution given by  , we are perhaps not yet in equilibrium, but we can calculate
the unconditional probability  ( ) that a recipient gets help if with score k he is helped with probability
hk =  + k  and the distribution of scores is given by pk( ). It equals  ( ) =
 
k
pk( )hk. The function  
is continuous in  . Further,  (0) =   > 0, and since   < 1   H ,  (1) =   + H  < 1 holds. Thus, there is
some    with  (  ) =   . This provides the required equilibrium. In this equilibrium all scores occur with
positive probability, because     (0,1) and because helping does not depend on the donor’s own score.
While we have simpliﬁed the environment, in particular by assuming that the game is repeated inﬁnitely
often, the basic insights intuitively apply to the setting of our experiment as well in case players disregard
the ﬁnal end. In particular, in an equilibrium among completely selﬁsh players, scores other than 0 should
only occur if adjacent scores that appear with positive probability yield the same expected payo .
35Appendix: Instructions
(Original Instructions were in German)
General Instructions
You are taking part in an economic experiment, which is being financed by various research pro-
moting foundations. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can - depending on the
decisions you will make - influence your own earnings as well as the earnings of the other partici-
pants of this experiment. It is, therefore, important that you pay attention to the instructions
given below.
The  instructions  distributed  are  intended  for  your  personal  information  only.  Absolutely  no
communication whatsoever is allowed for the duration of the experiment. Please address
questions you might have to us directly. Violation of this rule leads to the exclusion both from
the experiment itself and from all pertaining payments.
The experiment is divided into periods. During this experiment we do not deal with francs, but
with points. Your income from each period will, therefore, be calculated in points. The total
amount of points achieved in the course of the experiment will be converted into francs at the
rate of
1 point equals 10 rappen [100 rappen = 1 Swiss Franc].
At the beginning of the experiment you are allotted an endowment of 100 points, thus represent-
ing 10 francs.
In each period you form a group with one other participant. These groups of two are in each pe-
riod newly formed at random. It is possible, though not probable, that you will be linked with the
same participant in two consecutive periods. You cannot recognize the other participants, and
hence do not know whether you have been in a group together with the current other participant
before. This guarantees the anonymity of your decision.
Each group consists of one participant with the part A and one participant with the part B. Both
parts are, in each period, randomly and independently assigned. The probability of being assigned
part A for a period is 50 %, irrespective of the part held in the previous period. Therefore, it is
possible that you will assume part A or part B in several consecutive periods.2
Specific Instructions for the Experiment’s Procedure
Decisions to be made by the participants
During each period, in which you assume part A, you determine whether or not you want to help
the other participant of your group (who holds part B). If you assume part B no decision is re-
quired from you. If you, as the holder of part A, decide to help the other participant of your
group, you will be charged with a cost of 6 points, and the other participant of your group is
given 15 points. If you decide not to help the other participant of your group, you suffer no cost,
and the other participant receives nothing, resulting, for both of you, in the same amount of
points as at the beginning of the period.
Participants’ information types
The participants differ from each other insofar as other participants are, or are not, informed of
the decisions made. Participants, whose decisions are communicated to the other participants, are
referred to as Info types. The experiment comprises two stages consisting of 40 periods each. At
stage one, i.e. during the first 40 periods, one half of the participants are info types. At stage two,
the other half of the participants become info types. Thus, you will, like all other participants, be
an info type either during the first 40 periods or during the second 40 periods. You will always
know if you are an info type or not. If during the first 40 periods you were an info type, we will
inform you at the end of these 40 periods that for the rest of the experiment you will no longer be
an info type and vice-versa. Regardless whether you are an info type or not, you can in each pe-
riod be matched both with another info type or to a non-info type.
Information on info types
The last five decisions made by the info types are being computer-saved, i.e. saved will be the
number of times an info type (with part A) granted help and the number of times he denied help.
When an info type then assumes part B, this information is given to the other participant of the
group (assuming part A). This means that the participant with part A learns how many times the
participant with part B granted help during the last five periods and how many times he did not.
If at this stage the participant with part B assumed part A in less than five periods, the participant
with part A is informed of decisions B made in these periods.
If a participant is not an info type, no information on his decision-making is saved. In particular
this means that no-one is informed about the decisions made at the stage where one is not an info
type. Thus if at stage two of the experiment you are an info type, no information on the decisions
you made at stage one will be passed on to another participant.
Participants with part B are given no information on participants with part A.3
If you are an info type, whose current decisions as participant with part A are passed on to later
participants assuming part A, you are, at the beginning of a period, informed of how you decided
during the last five periods with part A (or during less than these five periods if you assumed part
A less than five times). This information is submitted to you regardless of which part, A or B,
you assume.
Stage two of the experiment
On completion of the 40 periods of stage one and after a short break we will get started with
stage two, again consisting of 40 periods. The info types of stage one are no longer info types,
and the non-info types of stage one become the info types of stage two. At stage two, all infor-
mation on the decisions made at stage one are no longer available. This means that the number of
periods with part A about which information is released, starts at zero for all participants.
However, the amount of points earned at stage one are carried over to stage two.4
Procedure on the Computer
The screen shown to both participants is divided in two sections. The upper section of the
screen is independent on whether you assume part A or part B.
Information given in the upper section of the screen
Each period reveals, in the upper section of the screen, the part you assumed in the previous
period as well as the decision the participant with part A made in the last period (see figures 1
and 2 below). Furthermore, you are shown your actual balance of points. As an info type you will
also see how many times during the last five periods as A (or during all previous periods as A, if
they amount to less than five) you granted help to the participant with part B and how many
times you denied it (see the example in figure 1). This is for your information. In the example in
Figure 1 you have been the participant with part A during the last period, granting help to the
participant with part B. During the last five periods with part A, you granted help twice and de-
nied it three times. The current balance is 121 points. The example in Figure 2 shows the upper
section of the screen, if you are not an info type. During the last period you assumed part B and
were granted help. Your current balance is 121 points.
Decision-making section for participants A
If you are the participant with part A, you make your decision in the lower section of the screen.
If the other participant of your group, i.e. the participant with part B, is an info type, you are i n-
formed about B’s last five decisions (i.e. about the last five periods where he assumed part A). In
the event that the other participant of your group, i.e. the participant with part B, is no info type,
you are informed about the fact that no information is released to you. The screen below shows
that the participant with part B granted help three times and denied it twice during the last five
periods where he assumed the part of A.
Below you will see the following question: “Do you help participant B in this period?” beside
the two fields “Yes” and “No”. Mouse-click one of these fields and activate the “OK” button. If
you choose “Yes” your balance of points will be reduced by 6 points and participant B’s
balance will be increased by 15 points. If you choose “No” neither your nor participant B’s
balance will be changed.
Besides, you will learn if you are an info type, which in this example applies. Thus your decision
will in future periods, where you assume part B, be revealed to the participant with part A as
long as these decisions belong to your last five decisions as the participant with part A and as
long as you are at the same stage of the experiment.5
Figure 1: Screen for participants with part A
Period
                                         13    of    40
In the last period you were participant A. You granted help.
As A during the last 5 periods
You granted help twice
You denied help three times.
Current balance of your points: 121
During this period you are participant A
Your participant B during the last 5 periods as A
Granted help three times
denied help twice.
Do you help participant B in this period        Yes
                                                                      No
Your decisions will be revealed to your future participants A
OK6
Lower section of the screen for participants with part B
The lower part of the screen only informs you that during this period you are not to make any
decision.
Figure 2: Screen for participants with part B
Period
                                         16    of    40
In the last period you were participant B. You were granted help.
Current balance of your points: 121
You are participant B. During this period you make no decision.
continue7
Control Questionnaire
Please answer all questions. Wrong answers have no consequences whatsoever! Address any
questions to us!
1. Participant A has 121 points, participant B has 112 points. Participant A helps participant
B. The balance of points of the participants is:
participant A: ............
participant B: ............
2. Participant A has 145 points, participant B has 127 points. Participant A denies participant
B help. The balance of points of the participants is:
participant A: ............
participant B: ............
3. Suppose you are an info type. During the last five periods you made the following deci-
sions: “help denied”, “help denied”, “help granted”, “help granted”, and “help denied” (in
this sequence). You are now again A. In the event that you now help and that in the next
period you assume part B: which information on your decisions will be released to partici-
pant A?
you granted help ............ times
you denied help ............ times
4. Suppose that during the first stage of the experiment you are an info type. In how many
periods, at the most, is the decision you make in period 37 revealed to another participant?
5. Suppose you had the part of B three consecutive times. What is the probability of you again
assuming part B during the next period?Learning and Peer Effects
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